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In early September 2018, two cases of monkeypox 
were reported in the United Kingdom (UK), diagnosed 
on 7 September in Cornwall (South West England) and 
11 September in Blackpool (North West England). The 
cases were epidemiologically unconnected and had 
recently travelled to the UK from Nigeria, where mon-
keypox is currently circulating. We describe the epide-
miology and the public health response for the first 
diagnosed cases outside the African continent since 
2003.
Monkeypox is a rare viral zoonotic disease that occurs 
mostly in Central and West Africa. In this report, we 
detail the identification of two separately imported 
cases of monkeypox to the United Kingdom (UK) in 
September 2018 and the public health response. 
Each case was managed as a separate incident in the 
absence of epidemiological evidence linking them 
in the UK and the public health responses were con-
ducted accordingly.
Case report 1
The first case, a Nigerian naval officer who was attend-
ing a training course at a naval base in Cornwall in the 
south-west of England, was notified to Public Health 
England (PHE) on 7 September. He arrived in London 
from Abuja, Nigeria on 2 September and travelled 
from London to the military base in Cornwall by train 
on the same day. The case presented to the general 
practitioner on the naval base on 3 September with 
fever, lymphadenopathy and a rash in the groin area 
that had developed the day before leaving Nigeria. The 
rash was initially thought to be due to a staphylococ-
cal infection and was treated with antibiotics. On 6 
September, the rash had spread to the torso, face and 
arms and after re-examination the patient was isolated 
in his quarters. Multiple samples including swabs of 
the lesions were sent for testing at the PHE Rare and 
Imported Pathogen Laboratory (RIPL). Monkeypox virus 
DNA was detected by multiple molecular assays and 
subsequently confirmed by sequencing analysis. The 
patient was then transported to the High Consequence 
Infectious Disease (HCID) Unit at the Royal Free Hospital 
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in London. The clinical condition of the case is stable 
and he is improving.
Case report 2
On 10 September, PHE was notified of a second sus-
pected case of monkeypox infection; the diagnosis 
was confirmed on 11 September. The individual is a 
UK resident who had returned from a 22-day holiday 
in Nigeria on 4 September on a flight via Paris, France. 
He presented to the Accident and Emergency depart-
ment at Blackpool Teaching Hospitals on 6 September 
with fever, lymphadenopathy, a scrotal lump and an 
itchy maculopapular rash. The rash was reported to 
have started before departing Nigeria on the face and 
later spread to other areas including the palms of the 
hands and had become pustular. The patient reported 
being unwell for approximately one week before pres-
entation, following a different febrile illness that had 
been treated with antibiotics in Nigeria. On clinical 
examination the patient had crops of vesicles that were 
progressing and lesions on the mucosal surfaces of the 
mouth. The patient was isolated at Blackpool Teaching 
Hospitals from 7 September and multiple samples, 
including swabs from the lesions, sent to RIPL con-
firmed the presence of monkeypox DNA by multiple 
molecular assays. Although the patient was isolated, 
monkeypox was not initially suspected because the 
first lesions appeared in the groin, and the wear-
ing of full personal protective equipment (a filtering 
face-piece with three indicating levels of protection 
(FFP3), eye protection, gloves and sterile disposable 
gown) was not implemented immediately. A number of 
healthcare workers (HCW) were potentially exposed as 
a consequence. The case was transferred to the HCID 
Unit at the Royal Liverpool University Hospital on 10 
September where they remain in a stable condition.
While the source of infection is not yet known, the 
patient reported contact with an individual with a 
monkeypox-like rash at a large family event and con-
sumption of bush meat during his visit to a rural area 
of Nigeria. Since notification of the first case, no other 
cases have been identified.
Public health response
The focus of the public health response in the UK has 
been to detect possible cases early, mitigate risks and 
minimise the potential for transmission and secondary 
cases, as well as to support cases in accessing appro-
priate clinical management. Ongoing response activi-
ties are in collaboration with national and international 
colleagues, including the Nigeria Centre for Disease 
Control and other partners.
Although there was no evidence for an epidemiologi-
cal link between the two cases in the UK, both had 
travelled in southern Nigeria before coming to the UK. 
While it was difficult to obtain clear travel histories from 
the patients, both cases had visited areas in southern 
Nigeria (Lagos State, Federal Capital Territory, Rivers 
State and Delta State), where cases of monkeypox have 
recently been reported (data not shown). The Nigeria 
Centre for Disease Control is currently conducting 
epidemiological investigations to identify contacts of 
these cases and to determine the source of infection.
As part of the response, PHE developed a range of pub-
lic information and guidance on monkeypox [1] and is 
liaising with European public health agencies via the 
Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) as well as 
other international public health agencies including the 
European Centres for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
about non-UK contacts and for rapid reporting of pub-
lic health events.
Contact tracing
As a precautionary measure, PHE identified possi-
ble contacts in the UK to carry out a risk assessment 
of their contact with the patient and to provide them 
with advice and information. The first incident was 
addressed with a contact-based approach to catego-
rise contacts. By the time of the second incident, the 
use of vaccine was being considered and a risk-based 
approach was adopted to facilitate this. Although not 
ideal, in practice this worked because the two cases 
were managed separately.
Criteria used to categorise contacts in South West 
England (Case 1)
Category 1
Direct contact with case – with symptoms within 21 
days: any individual who came into direct contact with 
the index case and who has developed relevant symp-
toms associated with exposure to monkeypox within 21 
days of contact.
Category 2
Direct contact with case – no symptoms within 21 days: 
any individual who came into direct contact with the 
index case who has not developed relevant symptoms 
within 21 days of contact.
Category 3
Indirect contact with case: any individual with only 
indirect contact with the index case (see indirect expo-
sure definition below).
A direct contact was defined as any individual who 
came into direct face-to-face contact with the index 
case or direct contact with contaminated materials 
(such as bedding) or sat in the same row or the three 
rows in front or behind on the flight or shared a taxi. 
Indirect contact was defined as contact with appropri-
ate personal protective equipment (PPE) or no face-
to-face contact and no contact with contaminated 
materials from the index case.
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Criteria used to categorise contacts in North West 
England (Case 2)
High-risk exposures
Direct exposure of broken skin or mucous membranes 
to a symptomatic (with rash) monkeypox case, their 
body fluids or potentially infectious material (including 
on clothing or bedding) without wearing appropriate 
PPE (including FFP3 or equivalent). This includes: inha-
lation of respiratory droplets or airborne material from 
scabs from cleaning rooms where a monkeypox case 
has stayed, mucosal exposure to splashes and pen-
etrating sharps injury from a used device or through 
contaminated gloves or clothing.
Intermediate risk exposures
Intact skin-only contact with a symptomatic (with rash) 
monkeypox case, their body fluids or potentially infec-
tious material  OR  passengers seated directly next to 
a case on a plane  OR  people with no direct contact 
but within 1 m of a symptomatic (with rash) monkey-
pox case without wearing appropriate PPE (including 
FFP3 or equivalent). Clinical examination of a monkey-
pox patient before diagnosis without appropriate PPE 
(including FFP3 or equivalent).
Low-risk exposures
HCW involved in care of a monkeypox case wearing 
appropriate PPE (with no known breaches) for all con-
tact episodes OR HCW involved in care of a monkeypox 
case not wearing appropriate PPE for all contact epi-
sodes but not within 1 m of the case and with no direct 
contact with body fluids or potentially infectious mate-
rial  OR  passengers seated within three rows from the 
case on a plane, except for passengers sitting directly 
next to the case ORcommunity contacts not within 1 m 
of the case, i.e. entering the case’s room not wearing 
PPE without direct contact with the case or his body 
fluids and maintaining a distance of more than 1 m 
from the patient. Healthcare staff working in an HCID 
specialist unit wearing appropriate PPE as described 
above.
Contacts outside the United Kingdom
PHE has contacted public health colleagues in France 
who identified and contacted passengers who were on 
the same flight from Lagos, Nigeria to Paris, France as 
Case 2. The country of residence was provided with 
details of any non-UK contacts for follow-up where 
necessary.
Management of contacts in the United 
Kingdom
Contacts are being monitored actively or passively 
depending on their level of exposure risk.
Active surveillance is used for those classified as hav-
ing a high- or intermediate-risk exposure to a case 
(direct contact in the South West), their body fluids or 
potentially infectious materials. This involves the des-
ignated PHE contact point contacting the individual 
every day throughout the 21-day follow-up period to 
check whether they develop any potential monkeypox 
prodromal symptoms such as fever, headache, mus-
cle aches, backache, swollen lymph nodes, chills or 
exhaustion.
Passive surveillance is used for individuals identified 
as having a low-risk exposure to a case, their body flu-
ids or potentially infectious material (Indirect contact 
in the South West). They will not be contacted daily 
during the follow-up period, but will be given a desig-
nated PHE contact point to phone if they feel unwell.
Currently 229 of 243 contacts are under investigation; 
93 are under active surveillance and 136 are under pas-
sive surveillance. Efforts to contact the remainder are 
ongoing. Following individual risk assessments (see 
above), 103 of 229 contacts were offered post-expo-
sure prophylaxis (PEP) or pre-exposure prophylaxis 
(PrEP) with vaccinia vaccine. Fifty-nine community 
and HCW contacts from the North West were offered 
PEP (46/59, uptake rate 78%) and 17 community and 
naval base contacts in the South West were offered 
PEP (5/17, uptake rate 29%). In addition, 27 HCWs in 
the HCID units at the Royal Liverpool (Case 2) and the 
Royal Free hospital (Case 1) managing the patients 
were offered PrEP. Vaccinees with symptoms consistent 
with vaccination reactions [2] arising in the 48 h post-
vaccination period would be monitored for a further 48 
h to discount those in the prodromal phase of monkey-
pox infection. The individual is advised to discontinue 
working and self-isolate at home during this time.
Each individual identified as a contact was provided 
with an information sheet which describes what monk-
eypox is, how it is spread, and what the symptoms are. 
This information sheet provides the individual with a 
designated PHE contact point and telephone number to 
ring should they develop any symptoms. Contacts can 
continue to work with no restrictions on their duties if 
they are asymptomatic. Individuals who develop any 
symptoms were directed to phone their designated PHE 
contact point straight away and to stop working until 
they are assessed by the Imported Fever Service (IFS). 
Contacts who were planning to travel out of the UK 
were advised that they may continue with their plans 
during their 21 days follow-up period if they are asymp-
tomatic. Any contacts under follow-up who are sympto-
matic are advised not to travel out of the UK.
Discussion
Monkeypox is a rare, zoonotic orthopoxvirus with a 
clinical presentation similar to smallpox [3-5]. The 
incubation period of monkeypox is usually from 6 to 
16 days but can range from 5 to 21 days depending on 
the route and nature of exposure [6,7]. Initial symp-
toms typically include fever and lymphadenopathy (a 
distinctive feature of monkeypox) followed by a macu-
lopapular rash that evolves through different stages 
[4,5,8,9]. Illness is usually self-limiting and most 
people recover within several weeks (usually 14 to 21 
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days), but severe disease can occur in some individu-
als, including those with underlying conditions such as 
severe immunosuppression. While evidence of mon-
keypox infection has been found in a number of ani-
mal species in Africa, the natural reservoir host(s) of 
monkeypox remains unknown [8,9] however, evidence 
suggests that native African rodents such as rope 
squirrels (Funisciurus  spp.), the Gambian pouched rat 
(Cricetomys gambianus) and other rodent species may 
be potential sources [10-13]. Contact with these ani-
mals and consumption of bush meat are thought to be 
potential methods of zoonotic transmission to humans. 
Human-to-human transmission is rare but can occur via 
close contact with skin lesions of an infected person, 
large respiratory droplets during prolonged face-to-
face contact or contaminated objects [5,7].
Since the first human case was recorded in 1970 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [14], an increas-
ing number of cases have been reported, suggesting 
that this is a re-emerging infectious disease [10,15]. In 
2018 in Africa, monkeypox cases have been reported 
from Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the DRC, 
Liberia and Nigeria. Nigeria has reported a large out-
break of monkeypox that began in September 2017 and 
peaked in week 41 2017. Since early 2018, between none 
and five cases have been reported per week. Between 
September 2017 and 31 August 2018, there were 262 
suspected cases across 26 states and 113 confirmed 
cases, including seven deaths in 16 states [13,16]. The 
highest number of cases have been reported from the 
South-South region of Nigeria [16].
Two phylogenetically distinct variants of monkeypox 
exist, the Central African (Congo-Basin) clade and the 
West African clade, and these clades differ in disease 
severity and transmissibility to humans [17]. Of the two 
clades, the Central African (Congo Basin) clade is asso-
ciated with more severe disease and transmits more 
readily by direct contact and large respiratory droplet 
transmission [6,8,17-19]. On the other hand, the West 
African clade, found to be responsible for the recent 
Nigerian outbreak is associated with a milder disease, 
less mortality and limited human-to-human transmis-
sion [20]. Preliminary sequence data for both cases are 
consistent with the Nigerian strains of the West African 
clade (data not shown).
The only other reported cases of human monkeypox 
infection outside Africa occurred in the United States 
(US) in 2003 [6,21,22]. They were was traced back to 
a shipment of West African rodents which were co-
housed with pet rodents, including prairie dogs at a 
pet store. Here we report the first cases of monkeypox 
infection diagnosed in the UK and Europe and repre-
senting importation by a traveller. To our knowledge, 
this is the only report since the 2003 outbreak in the 
US and the only report of travel-associated human 
cases diagnosed outside Africa.
Currently there is no licensed vaccine specifically for 
use against monkeypox, but smallpox vaccines are 
believed to provide a degree of cross-protective immu-
nity against other orthopox viruses, including mon-
keypox [2,23]. Extensive review of information on a 
third-generation smallpox vaccine (MVA-BN/Imvanex) 
[24,25] by the European Medicines Agency concluded 
that the benefits of this vaccine are greater than its 
risks and recommended that it be approved for use in 
the European Union for active immunisation against 
smallpox in adults [26]. Permissions were obtained 
from relevant authorities for off-label use of this vac-
cine in this incident to protect against monkeypox; it 
is currently being employed for pre- and post-exposure 
prophylaxis.
The detection of monkeypox cases in non-endemic 
countries is of public health concern. The diagnosis 
of two unconnected monkeypox cases within a short 
time frame in the UK is a highly unusual occurrence 
and most probably reflects the ongoing monkeypox 
transmission events in a number of African countries, 
including Nigeria. This incident reinforces the impor-
tance of infectious disease surveillance, clinical aware-
ness and early recognition and isolation, as well as 
the need to obtain a full travel history for all patients. 
This incident also highlights the importance of global 
health security initiatives and the rapid sharing of 
information, the need for continued collaborations and 
the strengthening of surveillance systems for emerging 
and re-emerging infectious diseases globally.
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